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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines changes in the Greek wage distribution over 1995-2002 and the role 
of skills in these changes using a matched employer-employee data set. This data set 
enables us to account for firm heterogeneity and obtain a more refined picture of the 
impact of skills. The methodology adopted is the Machado-Mata decomposition 
technique, which separates the part of wage changes that is due to changes in the 
job/employer and employee characteristics from the part due to changes in the returns to 
these characteristics. Our results indicate that the role of skills has been decisive. The 
skill return effects in combination with the composition effects of tenure, which are 
arguably responsive to economic developments and market conditions, have had an 
important contribution to the changes in the Greek wage distribution. On the other hand, 
the impact of predetermined demographic changes, as those captured by the age and 
education composition effects, has been relatively milder.  
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 1.  Introduction 
Education and job experience are traditionally seen as the most important 
dimensions of ‘skill’ for labour market participants. Highly educated and experienced 
workers have many job opportunities, receive high wages and enjoy good working terms 
and conditions. Through recent decades a variety of labour market outcomes has been 
linked to education in countries with different degrees of institutional flexibility. For 
instance, the rising wage inequalities in the ‘Liberal’ Anglo-Saxon countries have been 
attributed to the increased demand for skilled workers. Further, in the less flexible 
continental European countries, the relative increase in the unemployment of unskilled 
workers has also been attributed to the increased demand for skills (Krugman 1994; 
Blanchard and Wolfers 2000).  
Since the early 90s, the skill-biased technical change (SBTC) hypothesis has been 
the prevalent explanation for the growing wage inequalities (Katz and Autor 1999; 
Acemoglu 2002). Briefly, SBTC assumes that technology biases labour demand in favour 
of the skilled and against the unskilled. Lately, however, the SBTC has been losing 
ground over the novel idea of ‘routinization’. The ‘routinization’ hypothesis is a modified 
version of the SBTC hypothesis that takes the focus away from education and experience 
and moves it to the type of job content and the degree to which it can be routinized i.e., 
substituted by machinery and/or computers. It essentially assumes that technology 
increases demand for both high-skilled and low-skilled workers and decreases the 
demand for middle-skilled workers, as it replaces human labour mainly in routine tasks 
typically entailed in middle-skilled jobs (Autor, Levy and Murnane 2003; Autor, Katz 
and Kearny 2006, 2008; Goos and Manning 2007; Goos, Manning and Salomons 2009). 
While STBC and the variants of it have dominated Labour Economics a concurrent strand 
of the literature challenges the idea that technical change is the main driver of wage 
inequalities. This literature argues that inequalities by skill are mostly driven by non-
market, mainly socio-demographic changes and has justly earned itself the title of the 
‘revisionist’ (Card and DiNardo 2002; Lemieux 2006). 
Along these research dynamics and since the early 1990s the effect of education on 
inequality and labour market outcomes in Greece has attracted the attention of 
researchers. Most of these studies analyse the relationship between skills and pay and 
  5focus mainly on the education dimension of skill (Tsakloglou and Cholezas 2005 give a 
brief review). The bulk of the research utilizes data from the Greek Household Budget 
Survey that provide information on consumption expenditures, incomes and socio-
economic characteristics of the households and their members. This information has 
allowed the estimation of the returns to skills in the Greek labour market from the mid-
1970s till the late 1990s in Mincer-type wage equations. The available evidence suggests 
that both overall wage inequality and the returns to education declined between the mid-
1970s and the 1980s, but recovered again during the 1990s. This pattern has been 
attributed to interactions between an expanding educational system, a stagnant demand 
for educated workers and changing institutional structures.  
As in many other countries, the returns to education seem to have evolved 
differently across the wage distribution; the results are however mixed. In particular, by 
estimating Mincer wage equations on data from the early 1990s using quantile 
regressions, Martins and Pereira (2004) find that Greece is the only country out of 16 
analyzed that shows higher returns to education at the lower end of the wage distribution. 
Conversely, Cholezas (2004) examines Greek wages for the years 1974, 1988, 1994 and 
1999, and finds that in most cases returns to education follow a U-shaped pattern across 
the wage distribution.  
In this paper we use a newly developed matched employer-employee data set, 
covering a recent period of time (1995-2002), to examine how the distribution of 
individuals’ wages has changed in Greece and what has been the contribution of skills to 
these changes. First, following topical trends in the literature that point to the importance 
of other personal characteristics beyond education in shaping wages, we focus on the 
analysis of a broader dimension of employees’ skills. In particular, we consider the 
contribution of education and potential labour market experience that enhance ones 
competence irrespective of the employer and also of tenure that boosts the accumulation 
of firm-specific human capital.
1 Second, benefiting from the matched employer-employee 
data set we analyze the contribution of personal skills to changes in the wage distribution 
controlling for firm characteristics; by accounting for firm heterogeneity we are able to 
                                                 
1 The relationship between wages, labour market experience and tenure has attracted the attention of many 
studies (e.g. Dustmann and Meghir, 2005).  
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2 Third, we employ a 
methodology of counterfactual decomposition, recently developed by Machado & Mata 
(2005). This methodology moves beyond the simple estimation of returns to skills; it 
allows us to separate, at each decile of the wage distribution, the part of wage changes 
that is attributable to compositional changes of individual and workplace characteristics 
(net composition effects) from the part that is attributable to changes in the returns to 
these characteristics (net price effects). In interpreting these decomposition results we are 
able examine the relative importance of economic developments and predetermined 
compositional changes (e.g. changes in age, educational attainment) in shaping the 
changes in the wage distribution in Greece.  Traditionally, economic developments are 
assumed to influence returns. However, economic developments can also influence 
certain employee (i.e. tenure) and workplace characteristics. Given that we can perform 
the decomposition for the return and composition effects of each skill separately, 
economic developments can now be related not only to skill return effects but also to skill 
composition effects (cf.  Christopoulou et. al. 2010).  
We find that over 1995-2002 wage inequality increased; more so for men and those 
at the upper end of the wage distribution.  The decomposition results show that the role of 
skills has been essential in shaping the changes in the Greek wage distribution. 
Specifically, the combined impact of the skill price effects and the composition effects of 
tenure, which are very likely responsive to economic developments, has been significant.
 
3 On the other hand, predetermined demographic changes as those captured by the 
composition effects of education and age have had a relatively milder impact.   
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data and provides a 
description of the economic environment in Greece the period under investigation. 
Section 3 provides a descriptive analysis of wage changes, section 4 presents the 
methodology and section 5 discusses the results. The discussion of the results is given in 
four stages; we comment on the value added of controlling for employer heterogeneity in 
section 5.1, in 5.2 we give a general introduction to the decomposition results, in 5.3 we 
                                                 
2 Arguably, omission of firm variables will lead to unbiased estimates of worker returns only if firm and 
worker characteristics are uncorrelated; but this is very unlikely to hold in practise (cf. Hamermesh, 2008). 
3 Economic developments are assumed to encompass market conditions, i.e. demand and supply 
considerations and also changes in the institutional environment. 
  7focus on the skill effects, and in 5.4 we isolate the predetermined skill effects from the 
part that is induced by economic developments. A final section concludes. 
 
2.  Data and timing 
The data used in the empirical analysis are obtained from the Greek Structure of 
Earnings Survey (SES), which is compiled by the National Statistical Service of Greece. 
The Structure of Earnings Survey was first conducted in 1995 in the EU member states 
with the aim of compiling a dataset comparable across countries. This dataset would then 
serve as a useful basis for analysing the progress of economic and social cohesion. The 
survey was again conducted in 2002 and it has been decided that the survey will be 
repeated every four years.
4
The SES contains rich information on the structure and distribution of earnings and 
characteristics of employers and employees for two years: 1995 and 2002. Therefore, in 
comparison to household surveys that have been used in the literature to date, the SES 
has two important advantages. First of all, it avoids the measurement error problems of 
the household surveys.
5 Further, as already emphasized above, it enables controlling for 
both workers’ and firms’ characteristics when estimating wage equations. Its timing is 
also advantageous: it offers a more recent view of the labour market in comparison to 
previous studies and it coincides with a period of interesting economic developments. 
Next, the sample and its timing are discussed in turn. 
2.1.  The sample 
The sample of the Structure of Earning Survey is constructed by three-dimensional 
stratified random sampling covering firms of more than 10 employees in sectors such as 
manufacturing, construction and services (NACE C-K). The process of deriving the 
sample is the following: in the first step a sample of firms from the firm registry is 
selected, in the second step the sample of the local units belonging to the firms of the first 
                                                 
4 More details on the aim of the Structure of Earning Survey can be found on the website of the National 
Statistical Service of Greece (www.statistics.gr).  
5 It is widely documented in the literature that household surveys are contaminated with a significant degree 
of measurement error. The data on wages/income are mostly affected by this measurement error; 
individuals do not exactly recall their income and pay components or, for various reasons, are not willing to 
provide accurate information on their income sources. 
  8stage is selected, and in the final step a sample of employees belonging to the local unit is 
selected. Before the selection, firms are classified into strata according to region, 
economic activity (NACE 2-digit) and firm size (defined by the number of employees in 
the firm). 
The data available for the employees contain information on gender, age, the 
education level completed, tenure with the current employer. The data on job 
characteristics refer to the type of contract (part-time or full-time, contract of definite or 
indefinite length), the occupation, and whether the job entails supervisory duties. The 
data on employer characteristics contain information on the firm size, industry, location, 
main market in which the product of the firm is sold (regional, national, European or 
global), and the type of collective agreement enforced in the firm (national, sectoral, or 
firm level agreement).  
  The Structure of Earnings Survey also contains detailed information on the gross 
monthly earning of the employee, the various pay components such as overtime, irregular 
bonuses, hours worked and overtime hours. From the information provided we create the 
variable referring to hourly earnings including overtime and regular bonuses, which we 
use in the econometric analysis. More precisely, we use real hourly earnings (deflated by 
the Harmonized CPI).  
Before the econometric analysis we subject the data to a thorough ‘cleaning’. 
Incomplete or inaccurate observations are unavoidably deleted. Employees with age 15 to 
65 are included; employees with earnings below the 1st and above the 99th percentiles 
are excluded.
6 After the data inspection and cleaning we end up with 38701 observations 
for 1995 and 41449 for 2002. 
Table 1 provides selected information on the final ‘clean’ version of the sample. 
Firstly, following the widely-documented worldwide trend, the proportion of female 
employees has increased. Secondly, the average years of education have increased. 
Thirdly, average tenure with the same employer has decreased. This might be explained 
by a series of developments in the Greek economy. Specifically, there has been an 
                                                 
6 Our analysis requires a homogeneous sample between the two cross sections. We thus have to account for 
some differences between the two waves of the SES. For instance, observations for sectors covered only in 
one wave were deleted.  
  9increase in the proportion of employees under contracts of definite length.
7 Also there has 
been an increase in newcomers in the labour force, possibly driven by the increase in the 
working age population. This development is also observed in our sample, as the 
proportion of young workers increases in the 2002 wave. Moreover, there has been a 
process of integrating immigrants in the Greek labour market (the SES has also started 
including them in the sample).
8,9
Table 1: Sample characteristics   
Employee characteristics  1995 2002 Change 
Female (%)  31.70  37.36  5.66 
Years of education (average)  10.57  11.49  0.92 
Years of tenure (average)  10.08  8.26  -1.82 
Age: 15-24  years  (%)  5.92  7.30  1.38 
 25-34  years  (%)  29.95  32.97  3.02 
 35-44  years  (%)  34.09  30.26  -3.83 
 45-64  years  (%)  30.01  29.44  -0.57 
Employer characteristics       
Private ownership  (%)  69.61  83.50  13.89 
Firm size:  10-19 employees (%)  9.74  12.35  2.61 
  20-49 employees (%)  21.90  16.71  -5.19 
  50-99 employees (%)  21.17  10.88  -10.29 
  >100 employees (%)  47.19  60.05  12.86 
Manufacturing sector (%)  48.30  36.13  -12.17 
Note: % refers to % of employees in the sample. 
Immigrant workers are likely to have more job mobility and also work under contracts of 
definite length. 
There are some changes in firm characteristics that are also worth mentioning. The 
proportion of employees working in the private sector has increased, and so has the 
proportion of employees working in bigger firms (with more than 100 employees). The 
                                                 
7 This is verified by the sample; the proportion of employees not having contracts of indefinite length has 
increased from around 2% in 1995 to 8.8% in 2002. Given the limited variability in the variable that 
captures alternative contract types in the 1995 wave we do not control for contract types in our regression 
analysis.  
8 For a detailed analysis of Greek labour market developments between 1995 and 1999 see Sabethai (2000). 
9 Controls for immigrant status are not included in our analysis due to insufficient data especially in the 
1995 wave.  
  10former fact may be related to the process of privatizations. Finally, the manufacturing 
employment seems to have followed a decreasing trend the period under investigation.  
2.2.  The timing: an overview of the Greek  economy between 1995-2002 
Table 2 below presents various indicators that provide a general picture of the 
economic environment in Greece over the period 1995-2002. This period was a special 
period for Greece as it coincided with the years preceding the euro adoption and the need 
to fulfil the accession criteria. As one can see in the table, Greece ‘delivered’ in terms of 
macroeconomic performance; it experienced a high and increasing GDP growth rate (at 
the same time that the growth rate in two of the EU's core countries, Germany and 
France, as well as in the  US was low and decreasing). Following the requirement for the 
euro adoption, inflation was also significantly reduced, with the increase in the 
unemployment rate being a possible consequence of policies aiming at this reduction. 
In addition, the period 1995-2002 was also characterised by significant 
demographic, macroeconomic and institutional changes - some country-specific and 
some common across advanced countries. For the demographic developments, we have 
already gotten a flavour from the description of the sample characteristics. The Greek 
labour market has experienced an increase in female labour force participation, like the 
majority of the OECD countries. Additionally, the inflow of immigrants has also 
increased substantially.
10  
                                                 
10 This is documented in detail by Zografakis, Kontis and Mitrakos (2009). 
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   1995  2002  Change 
Real GDP growth (2000 constant prices)  2.1  3.9  1.8 
Unemployment rate  9  10.3  1.3 
Inflation rate  9.8  3.7  -6.1 
Proportion of foreign population  2.8 (1998)  4.1  1.3 
Female labour force participation  44.3  50.1  5.8 
Population share of 15-24  year-olds  20.4  19.3  -1.1 
Population share of 25-49 year-olds  51.3  54.4  3.1 
Population share of 50-64 year-olds  28.3  26.3  -2 
Trade in goods and services to GDP  18.8  23.3  4.5 
Share of ICT investment in total gross fixed capital formation  10  11.5  1.5 
Minimum relative to median wages of full-time workers  0.53  0.46  -0.07 
Strictness of employment protection legislation (range 0-6)  3.5  3.5  0 
Overall product market regulation (range 0-4)  2.8 (1998)  2  -0.8 
Source: OECD Statistics 
 
At the same time, as indicated by the measures of investment in Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICT), technical change was gradually transforming parts 
of the production process; openness was also increasing as the evolution of the ratio of 
trade-to-GDP shows. Coming now to institutional flexibility, there are indications that 
product market regulation was decreasing.
11 Employment protection legislation, on the 
other hand, seems to have been unchanged the period under investigation. However, 
despite the unchanged employment protection legislation index and the fact that the 
Greek system of wage bargaining is still considered to be broadly regulated (for more 
details see DuCaju et.al. 2008) the Greek labour markets were also becoming more 
flexible. 
12  This flexibility involved the introduction of flexible working time 
arrangements (i.e. part-time jobs) and  more flexible types of  employment contracts such 
                                                 
11 The product market regulation indicator presented in Table 2 captures mainly barriers to entry. For a 
detailed description of its construction see Conway et. al (2005). 
12 The perceptions and experiences of market participants may also be indicative of the ‘effective’ degree of 
employment protection the period under investigation. Specifically, evidence from EU ad hoc surveys 
conducted in 1999, indicates that firms do not consider the Greek labour markets to be as inflexible as they 
may initially seem. More precisely, Greek firms in the industry do not consider regulation as an obstacle for 
adjusting employment and production during demand fluctuations (for a detailed description see Sabethai, 
2000 and references therein).  
  12as  contracts of definite length, contracts for the provision of  specific services and for 
carrying out a specific task (for a more detailed analysis see Sabethai, 2000). 
13  
Overall, the period under investigation is a period of significant economic, 
institutional and demographic developments. We now proceed to analyse whether the 
distribution of wages has changed in Greece over 1995-2002 and which are the factors 
that have mostly contributed to these changes. 
 
3.  Observed wage changes 
The direction, magnitude and nature of wage changes between the two sample 
waves is roughly indicated by changes in the measures of mean and standard deviation, 
which amount to 0.052 and 0.087 log points respectively, when taking men and women 
together. These numbers reflect a pattern of slow and asymmetrical wage movement. 
Still, it says little if not compared with similar changes in other countries. Christopoulou, 
Jimeno and Lamo (2010) provide a comparison of the two measures between Greece and 
eight other EU countries, for which comparable SES data is available. They show that 
putting Ireland's and Hungary's impressive wage growth aside, Greece's average wage 
change is well in line with the experiences of the other European countries. The change in 
the standard deviation of hourly wage, though, stands out. After Germany, Greece is the 
second country in the group with the biggest increase in wage dispersion (for more details 
see Christopoulou, Jimeno and Lamo,  2010, Table A1, p. 32).   
Figure 1 and Table 3 describe the shift in the Greek wage distribution in detail, 
serving to reveal a very interesting picture. In the aggregate sample, real hourly wages 
have remained more or less constant up to the 5th decile of the distribution and have 
monotonically increased thereafter. 
 
                                                 
13 Undoubtedly, labour market outcomes are not exogenous to economic developments, such as increased 
trade openness and product market deregulation; thus the structure of labour market institutions may evolve 
further in the coming years. In particular, the literature predicts that competition from low cost producers 
and product markets deregulation may indirectly have an impact on trade unions’ power and employment 
regulations (for a discussion on the effects of product market regulation see Fiori et. al. 2008).  
  13In other words, the moderate increase in mean wages has not been shared equally 
among employees, but rather those at the upper part of the wage distribution (high wage 
workers) have become better off while the wages of those at the lower part of the 
distribution have not increased as much. As a result wage inequality has increased and 
this can be attributed to increasing upper tail inequality; on the other hand, lower tail 
inequality has not increased as much (Table 3). Christopoulou, Jimeno and Lamo (2010) 
show that Germany and the Netherlands have experienced comparable increases in 
overall wage inequality; however, in these two countries inequality has increased more 
for those at the lower end of the wage distribution. In fact, the Greek experience appears 
to be similar to that of the US and the UK, over the same eight year period (Autor, Katz 
and Kearny 2006; Autor et. al. 2008 and Machin and Van Reenen 2007).
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When disaggregating the sample by gender, the picture becomes slightly different. 
Specifically, the wage movement is still concentrated at the upper part of the distribution 
both for men and women. For men, however, at the bottom of the distribution one can 
clearly see some wage falls, which wear out when moving towards the middle, switching 
to wage increases after the 5th decile (see Figure 1). In contrast, the wages of women 
have not decreased at all. Instead, starting from a low relative wage level in 1995, women 
have been catching up, experiencing wage increases from the 2nd decile of the 
  14distribution onwards. As a result, the overall increase in wage inequality has been larger 
for men (see Table 3).  
These different experiences motivate our choice to analyse wage changes both for 
the full sample (pooled regressions) and separately by gender. In the first case we assume 
that returns to characteristics are the same for both men and women and there are only 
intercept differences captured by a gender dummy. In the second case we allow for full 
heterogeneity in wage determination by estimating separate regressions for males and 
females. 
 
Table 3: Key indicators of the wage distribution 
      Std. Dev  Median  P90/P10  P50/P10  P90/P50  Gini coef. 
All 1995 0.38  1.88  1.69 1.30 1.30 0.22 
  2002 0.47  1.89  1.85 1.33 1.40 0.27 
  Change  0.09  0.01  0.16 0.02 0.10 0.05 
Males  1995 0.38  1.98  1.67 1.32 1.27 0.22 
  2002 0.48  2.01  1.86 1.37 1.36 0.28 
    Change  0.10  0.03  0.20 0.06 0.09 0.06 
Females  1995 0.32  1.67  1.59 1.21 1.31 0.19 
  2002 0.41  1.73  1.74 1.25 1.39 0.24 
    Change  0.09  0.06  0.15 0.04 0.08 0.05 
 
 
4.  The Methodology 
The analysis relies on the estimation of extended Mincer equations for log (real) 
hourly wages at different deciles of the wage distribution for each year t, using the 
quantile regressions method: 
∑ = + + =
j
it jit jt t it X X w Q with X a w
ϑ ϑ
ϑ
ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ β ε β ) | (ln , ln  
where wi represents the wage of individual i, X is the vector of observable labour 
market characteristics,   is a constant, and β
∂ a ϑ is the vector of parameters. Qϑ(lnw|X) 
  15denotes the ϑth conditional quantile of lnw given X. ε is the stochastic error. Given these 
estimates, we decompose the change between the 1995 and 2002 log wage distributions 
into a part that is due to changes in labour market characteristics and a part that is due to 
changes in the returns to these characteristics. The decomposition by decile is performed 
using the quantile decomposition approach recently developed by Machado and Mata 
(2005).
 14 This decomposition method can be considered as a generalization of the 
Oaxaca and Blinder (1973) technique; the latter by focusing exclusively on the mean of 
the wage distribution could not be informative in the analysis of wage inequality.  The 
decomposition is performed on the basis of the following idea.  Two counterfactual 
densities are estimated: (i) the wage density corresponding to the 1995 distribution of 
characteristics with returns held constant at 2002 levels, and (ii) the wage density 
corresponding to the 2002 distribution of characteristics with returns held constant at 
1995 levels. 
The linearity of the quantile regression implies: 
() ( ) ( ) () ∑∑ − + − + − + − = −
jj
j j j j j j X X X a a w w
ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ε ε β β β 95 02 95 95 02 95 02 02 95 02 95 02 ln ln
 
where wtϑ is the ϑth decile of the wage distribution in year t, 
ϑ
jt X  is the vector of 
mean characteristics of decile ϑ at year t, and 
ϑ εt is the mean of the unobserved 
component. 
We carry out the computation of mean characteristics by decile according to the 
adaptation of the Machado-Mata bootstrap method by Albrecht, Bjorklund and Vroman 
                                                 
14  Various methodologies have been developed to analyze changes in the distribution of wages. One 
methodology that has been widely used in the literature is the one developed by DiNardo et.al (1996). This 
technique, however, does not explicitly model the role of prices (see Autor et. al 2005). The Machado and 
Mata methodology by being parametric can decompose the changes in the wage distribution into the part 
that is due to changes in the distribution of covariates and the part that is due to changes in the coefficients 
(for a discussion see Machado and Mata, 2005). Another quantile based decomposition technique, which is 
in the spirit of the Machado and Mata methodology, has recently been developed by Melly (2005 and 
2006). This technique is numerically identical to that of Machado and Mata as the number of simulations 
goes to infinity (see Melly, 2006). It is a useful alternative to the Machado Mata method if one is interested 
in analysing the changes in the distribution of wages that are also due to changes in the residuals. The latter 
effects are, though, beyond the scope of the present study. 
 
  16(2003). To describe it in simple terms, for each year, we draw a random sub-sample of 
100 observations (i.e. individuals) from the whole sample. We sort the observations of 
the sub-sample by hourly pay and obtain the resulting decile values of the variables of 
interest. We repeat these steps 500 times, obtaining 500 values per variable in each 
decile. We then calculate the average of these 500 values in each decile, ending up with 
10 values per variable (i.e. one for each decile). 
Once the mean characteristics have been calculated, the wage changes by decile 
over the period 1995-2002 are decomposed as follows: ( )
ϑ ϑ
95 02 a a −  is due to changes in 
unobserved features common among employees and due to changes in the reference 
categories (dummies);  ( ) ∑ −
j
j j j X X
ϑ ϑ ϑ β 95 02 02  is due to changes in (employer or employee) 
observable characteristics net of any price effects (composition effect);   
() ∑ −
j
j j j X
ϑ ϑ ϑ β β 95 95 02  is due to changes in the returns to (employer or employee) 
characteristics net of any composition effects (price effects); and ( )
ϑ ϑ ε ε 95 02 −  is due to 
changes in the remaining unobserved component. 
Customarily in the empirical analysis of Mincer equations X only includes 
variables representing individual/employee characteristics (i.e. educational level, age, age 
squared, tenure, tenure squared, a constant, and a gender dummy). An important reason 
for this is that the arrival of matched employer-employee datasets has been relatively 
recent. In a sweeping review of the international literature, Abowd and Kramarz (1999) 
note that virtually all papers using matched employer-employee data appeared after the 
late 1990s and, in their majority, the databases used have been European. Taking 
advantage of the information available in the Greek Structure of Earnings Survey we 
introduce variables that control for job and employer characteristics when analyzing the 
contribution of skills to changes in the wage distribution.  
 
5.  Results 
In this section we first estimate Mincer equations in two alternative specifications; 
one including only employee characteristics -specification 1- and one including employee 
  17as well as employer and job characteristics - specification 2 - (subscripts t and i are 
suppressed for simplicity): 
∑ + + =
j
j j X a w
ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ε β ln       ( 1 )  
      ∑ ∑ + Χ + + =
j







ϑ ϑ ϑ ϑ ε β β ln      (2) 
j now indicates individual characteristics and k employer or job characteristics.
15 We 
perform this exercise in order to compare the results of the two specifications and 
examine to what extent our understanding of the sources of earnings variations is refined 
when we control for both worker and workplace heterogeneity as opposed to controlling 
for worker heterogeneity only. We next continue with the analysis and the interpretation 
of the detailed decomposition results. These decomposition results are based on the 
estimation of our preferred specification, the extended specification 2 that accounts for 
firm heterogeneity.  
5.1.  The added value of controlling for employer heterogeneity 
Regressions using worker-based datasets typically explain about 30% of wage 
variation. This is also the case for the Greek results derived from Household Budget 
Survey data (see for instance Table 7 in Tsakloglou and Cholezas (2005)). With this as a 
benchmark, Table 4 presents the estimated R² values corresponding to our OLS 
estimations from the SES database by specification, year, and gender-group. Markedly, 
regressions using only individual characteristics explain 40-53% of wage variation, which 
is already a significant improvement in explanatory power. However, the incorporation of 
controls for employer/job characteristics increases the proportion explained even further, 
to as much as 63%. A similar pattern appears when looking at the residual standard 
deviation (RSD), the classic measure of within-group wage inequality a la Juhn, Murphy, 
and Pierce (1991, 1993), which is also reported in Table 4. Within-group or 
                                                 
15 The variables used to capture individual characteristics are: years of education, tenure in years, tenure 
squared, age dummies, dummy for gender, dummy for vocational degree. The variables used to capture the 
respective employer and job characteristics are: sector dummies (2-digit NACE), occupational dummies (1-
digit ISCO), size dummies, dummy for private ownership, dummies for the main market for the firms' 
products, regional dummies, and dummies for collective agreements. 
  18‘unexplained’ wage inequality appears larger for specification 1 than for specification 2 
for all years and samples. 
At the same time, the inclusion of employer characteristics also alters the wage 
effects of the key worker characteristics. For example, if one looks at the estimated OLS 
coefficients (Table A1 in the Appendix), while specification 1 suggests that the return to 
1 additional year of education is about 3.3% in 1995 this falls to 1.7% once the regression 
is estimated using information on both employers and employees in specification 2.  
 
Table 4: Estimated R²-adjusted and RSD from OLS regressions 
    1995      2002  
   All  Males  Females    All  Males  Females 
R²-adj. Spec.  1  0.47  0.40  0.43    0.53  0.52  0.45 
 Spec.  2  0.58  0.53  0.57    0.63  0.62  0.60 
RSD Spec.  1 0.28 0.29  0.29   0.32 0.33  0.33 
   Spec. 2  0.25  0.25  0.28    0.28  0.29  0.30 
 
Such differences between the two specifications are also manifest in the results of 
the quantile regressions.
16  Briefly, in line with Choleza's (2004) findings for Greece and 
similar findings for other countries (e.g. Machado and Mata 2005 for Portugal; Izquierdo 
and Lacuesta 2006 for Spain), the returns to education appear to increase across the wage 
distribution in both specifications.
 17 Also, they increase across time at every point of the 
distribution in both specifications. However, the increases suggested by specification 1 
are always larger in magnitude than the increases suggested by specification 2. The same 
applies to the coefficients of the gender dummy. In both specifications, they reflect a 
gender wage gap that increases in high paid jobs and decreases in time.
18 However, the 
                                                 
16 Detailed quantile regression results are presented in Tables A1-A6 in the Appendix. 
17 It should be noted that this result is at odds with the findings of Martins and Pereira (2004) for Greece; 
they find that returns to education are higher at the lower quantiles. This counterintuitive result may be due 
to the hourly earnings variable they use and/or due to the fact that they do not account for employer 
characteristics. They use net hourly earnings. As the authors claim the latter measure is influenced by 
progressive taxation; this may provide inaccurate results for the returns to education for Greece - returns to 
education are eroded at higher wage quantiles. 
18 Our findings on the gender wage gap are in line with a long-standing tradition, starting with Bergman's 
(1971, 1974) pioneering work in the early 1970s, and subsequently followed by a long list of literature. The 
  19magnitudes suggested are always higher for specification 1. The story is similar for the 
majority of the coefficients on employee characteristics.
 19  
Qualitatively, the two specifications provide the same results for the employee 
characteristics but the magnitude of the effects differ. Specification 1 tends to 
systematically overestimate the returns to employee characteristics. This however, does 
not come as a surprise as specification 1 does not control for firm heterogeneity. As 
Hamermesh (2008) argues if one has a lot of information on workers and little on firms 
the results will show that worker characteristics matter a lot. On the other hand if one has 
a lot of information on firms the results will show that firm characteristics matter a lot. 
20  
Accounting for more heterogeneity leads to a better insight into the ‘true’ impact of 
employer and employee characteristics and specification 2 is a way towards this 
direction. 
21
Figure 2 presents the respective decomposition outcomes for each specification, i.e. 
the breakdown of observed wage changes into composition and price effects by decile. 
Interestingly, the contribution of price and composition effects differs significantly 
between specifications. Specification 1 underestimates the contribution of composition 
effects along the entire wage distribution.  It tends also to overestimate the contribution of 
                                                                                                                                                   
reasons for it stretch from discrimination on the demand-side to female self-selection in certain occupations 
on the supply-side. Women may select occupations that require smaller human capital investment, as they 
anticipate shorter and less continuous work-lives, or occupations more compatible with the performance of 
household work or occupations that are traditionally dominated by women. Evidence on gender 
discrimination in the Greek labour market from a series of empirical studies also endorses the segregation 
assumption (e.g. Patrinos and Lambropoulos 1993; Kanellopoulos and Mavromaras 2002; Papapetrou 
2004). 
19 The results on employer characteristics, in specification 2, are in line with the finding of studies using 
similar data sets. For instance, we find that larger firms pay in general higher wages (cf. Arai, 2003 for 
evidence on Sweden; Magda et. al 2008 for evidence on various EU countries). Interestingly, the relative 
wage loss of the employees working in smaller firms is higher at higher wage deciles. Also, workers 
covered by a firm level agreement seem to earn higher wages (cf. Magda et. al. 2008). The results are not 
presented due to space consideration but are available upon request. 
20 For instance, studies analysing the impact of firm profitability on wages show that the effect of firm 
profits on wages is significantly lower when estimated from regressions that control for both firm and 
employee characteristic than when estimated from regressions that control for firm characteristics only  (cf. 
Arai, 2003; Nekby 2003).   
21 Arguably, some of the variables capturing firm and job characteristics may be endogenous (outcome 
variables) and thus lead to selection bias.  Among the variables included the occupation variable may 
perhaps be considered as endogenous (see Angrist and Pischke , 2009  for a rule of thumb for detecting 
‘outcome’ variables). We, however, proceed with the analysis of specification 2 as, in an accounting 
exercise like ours that does not exclusively aim at estimating the causal wage effect of occupational status, 
it is constructive to know what part of the change in the wages, at different deciles, can be explained by 
firm, job and worker returns and characteristics (cf. Albrecht et al. 2003).   
  20price effects at high deciles and to underestimate it at low deciles.
22  Specifically, in 
specification 1, the composition effects at the 9th decile are 0.12 log points higher than at 
the 1st decile, while the same difference for the price effects is 0.21. Likewise, the 
difference between the 9th and 5th deciles is 0.17 for composition and 0.14 for price 
effects, respectively. In contrast, in specification 2, the composition effects at the 9th 
decile are 0.22 log points higher than at the 1st decile, while the same difference for the 
price effects is 0.05; the respective differences between the 9th and the 5th deciles are 
0.24 for composition and 0.02 for price effects. An important common result of the two 
specifications should, however, be acknowledged. Both specifications suggest that ‘price’ 
effects have been favourable for wages throughout the wage distribution, and that the 
slight wage-falls that took place at the lower deciles are attributable to the negative 
composition effects.  
Controlling for employer characteristics is thus essential not only for obtaining an 
insight into the ‘true’ returns to skills but also for identifying the factors that shape the 
changes in the wage distribution. The role of price/return effects would have been 
overestimated if inference was based on a model that did not control for the observable 
firm heterogeneity.  
                                                 
22 The composition and price effects from specification 2 are due to both employee and employer/job 
characteristics. 





















































































































































1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
_
_m3













  225.2.  Aggregate price and composition effects  
We now proceed to the analysis of the results of specification 2. First, we briefly 
look into the aggregate composition and return effects of employee and employer/job 
characteristics. As Figure 2 indicates composition effects are negative except for the 
upper deciles. Therefore, they have a considerable inequality increasing effect as they 
tend to push wages downwards for those at the lower deciles of the wage distribution and 
raise them for those at high deciles. Hence, even if the returns to the employers' and 
employees' characteristics had remained constant, compositional changes would imply a 
significant increase in wage inequality. Moreover, even though the overall return effects 
have been positive throughout the distribution, they tend to favour slightly those at high 
wage deciles; they thus also have a mild inequality increasing effect.  
What is also interesting is the difference in the importance of price and composition 
effects between men and women. When looking at men only, composition effects are 
larger in absolute value at most deciles; for women, though, it is the price effects that 
dominate. In fact, the domination of the price effects is strong enough to make no 
allowance for wage falls. Thus, the changes in the wage distribution among women are 
not driven by their changing composition but rather by increases in the returns to their 
labour market characteristics. These results are broadly indicative of the fact that women 
are catching up.   
Next we continue to analyse in detail the contribution of price and composition 
effects of skills. Knowing how the composition and return effects of skills influence wage 
changes and wage inequality is important. Firstly, this can be a potential useful starting 
point for assessing now and in the future the impact of policies aiming at increasing the 
educational attainment of the labour force or of policies that increase job mobility and 
affect tenure and the formation of firm-specific human capital (i.e. more flexible 
employment contracts). Secondly, it would be also interesting to know whether the 
various returns to skill effects follow patterns that are in line with the skill-biased 
technical change or the variants of it.  
 
 
  235.3.  Wage changes due to skill 
Table 5 presents in turn the breakdown of wage changes into price and composition 
effects of each employee characteristic/skill obtained from the full sample estimation and 
the separate estimation by gender. The list of employee characteristics we control for is: 
age as a proxy of general labour market experience, years of education, tenure as an 
indicator of job-specific experience
23, a dummy variable for holders of vocational degrees 
and a dummy variable for females (in the full sample estimations).
24
The decomposition results for age are presented in two categories: the youth or 
minimal experience category that refers to employees with years of age between 15 and 
24, and the prime-age adult or medium-high experience category that refers to employees 
with years of age between 25 and 54; the latter category aggregates the effects of three 
age-bundles (i.e., 25-34, 35-44, 45-54).
25 The decomposition results for tenure include the 
combined effects of tenure and tenure-squared. 
                                                 
23 Age and tenure are separately included in the regression to account for the wage effects of general labour 
market experience and the effects of firm-specific experience  respectively (e.g. Machado and Mata,  2005; 
Izquierdo and Lacuesta 2006). One could argue that there is some association between age/experience and 
tenure. In large cross-sections, however, this association is weakened by the fact that different individuals 
may have different levels of labour market experience when entering their current job.  
24 The information on age is given in age categories/bundles rather than in years; thus regressions include a 
dummy variable per age bundle.  
25 Employees between 55-64 years of age constitute the reference category. 
  24Table 5a: Composition and price effects due to employee characteristics by decile, all 
 P10 P20 P30 P40 P50 P60 P70 P80 P90
Observed wage change  -.0214 -.0141 -.0080 -.0077 -.0074 .0480 .0997 .1474 .1953
Total composition effects  -.0819 -.0682 -.0794 -.0936 -.0921 -.0522 -.0002 .0596 .1452
of which due to: Age (if < 25)  -.0096 -.0175 -.0062 -.0064 -.0068 .0012 -.0006 -.0007 -.0023
  Age (if > 24)  .0056 .0016 -.0047 -.0005 -.0065 -.0119 -.0074 -.0074 .0035
 Education  .0106 .0172 .0151 .0150 .0134 .0214 .0108 .0202 .0308
 Tenure  -.0567 -.0581 -.0580 -.0668 -.0803 -.0574 -.0495 -.0331 .0088
 Vocat.  degree  -.0003 -.0003 -.0006 -.0006 -.0006 -.0001 -.0002 .0003 .0000
 All  skills  -.0504 -.0571 -.0544 -.0593 -.0808 -.0468 -.0469 -.0207 .0408
 Sex  (female)  .0010 .0010 -.0077 -.0086 -.0018 -.0123 -.0159 -.0138 -.0103
  
Total price effects  .0349 .0418 .0512 .0647 .0683 .0829 .0948 .0847 .0888
of which due to: Age (if < 25)  -.0050 -.0045 -.0039 -.0017 -.0010 -.0006 -.0008 -.0002 -.0002
  Age (if > 24)  -.0280 -.0523 -.0533 -.0603 -.0690 -.0666 -.0619 -.0600 -.0457
 Education  .0395 .0359 .0306 .0263 .0223 .0296 .0273 .0311 .0341
 Tenure  .0240 .0185 .0118 .0101 .0069 .0083 .0134 .0176 .0211
 Vocat.  degree  -.0012 -.0016 -.0029 -.0041 -.0049 -.0070 -.0070 -.0086 -.0061
 All  skills  .0293 -.0040 -.0177 -.0279 -.0457 -.0363 -.0290 -.0201 .0032
 Sex  (female)  .0067 .0155 .0154 .0117 .0117 .0087 .0085 .0065 .0027
 
  25Table 5b: Composition and price effects due to employee characteristics by decile, males 
 P10 P20 P30 P40 P50 P60 P70 P80 P90
Observed wage change  -.0457 -.0412 -.0297 -.0129 .0269 .0835 .1237 .1741 .2111
Total composition effects  -.1066 -.0920 -.0905 -.0666 -.0804 .0345 .0537 .1389 .1820
of which due to: Age (if < 25)  -.0142 -.0215 -.0085 .0017 -.0042 -.0038 -.0014 -.0008 -.0008
  Age (if > 24)  -.0008 -.0061 -.0129 -.0038 -.0145 -.0138 -.0058 .0091 .0111
 Education  .0098 .0295 .0228 .0158 .0134 .0229 .0193 .0168 .0288
 Tenure  -.0619 -.0723 -.0739 -.0701 -.0757 -.0464 -.0357 .0016 .0233
 Vocat.  degree  -.0005 -.0013 -.0004 -.0004 -.0002 .0000 .0002 .0000 .0017
 All  skills  -.0677 -.0718 -.0730 -.0567 -.0812 -.0413 -.0234 .0267 .0641
   
Total price effects  .0358 .0342 .0515 .0533 .0590 .0442 .0619 .0507 .0331
of which due to: Age (if < 25)  -.0044 -.0021 -.0017 -.0014 -.0004 .0000 .0000 .0000 .0000
  Age (if > 24)  -.0247 -.0579 -.0499 -.0598 -.0652 -.0637 -.0637 -.0613 -.0452
 Education  .0367 .0330 .0335 .0255 .0403 .0375 .0525 .0471 .0400
 Tenure  .0191 .0143 .0106 .0008 .0009 .0027 .0076 .0177 .0329
 Vocat.  degree  -.0034 -.0031 -.0044 -.0065 -.0079 -.0088 -.0128 -.0087 -.0111
 All  skills  .0233 -.0158 -.0119 -.0414 -.0323 -.0323 -.0164 -.0053 .0166
 
Table 5c: Composition and price effects due to employee characteristics by decile, females 
 P10 P20 P30 P40 P50 P60 P70 P80 P90
Observed wage change  .0006 .0206 .0367 .0431 .0605 .0739 .1089 .1627 .2135
Total composition effects  -.0657 -.0513 -.0436 -.0539 -.0423 -.0142 -.0148 .0681 .1207
of which due to: Age (if < 25)  -.0035 .0000 -.0045 -.0046 -.0023 -.0049 -.0015 .0022 .0020
  Age (if > 24)  -.0007 -.0011 -.0082 -.0014 -.0032 .0029 .0013 .0007 .0146
 Education  .0073 .0194 .0160 .0125 .0145 .0156 .0115 .0215 .0127
 Tenure  -.0451 -.0556 -.0384 -.0466 -.0526 -.0436 -.0386 -.0172 .0069
 Vocat.  degree  .0004 -.0001 -.0002 -.0007 -.0011 -.0005 -.0007 -.0001 .0000
 All  skills  -.0416 -.0374 -.0354 -.0407 -.0447 -.0306 -.0280 .0071 .0362
   
Total price effects  .0224 .0527 .0671 .0826 .0883 .0963 .1123 .1168 .1303
of which due to: Age (if < 25)  -.0089 -.0078 -.0060 -.0046 -.0041 -.0034 -.0040 -.0016 -.0020
  Age (if > 24)  -.0355 -.0516 -.0642 -.0730 -.0650 -.0714 -.0929 -.0914 -.0679
 Education  .0410 .0484 .0333 .0288 .0210 .0181 .0184 .0251 .0186
 Tenure  .0262 .0270 .0225 .0232 .0283 .0280 .0243 .0174 .0222
 Vocat.  degree  .0000 -.0002 -.0004 -.0003 -.0006 -.0006 -.0009 -.0010 -.0029
 All  skills  .0227 .0158 -.0148 -.0260 -.0203 -.0293 -.0552 -.0515 -.0320
  26Looking, first, at the contribution of the skill composition effects, already provides 
confirmation of their leading role in the determination of wage changes. The estimated 
composition effects of all skills together are negative for most deciles. In addition, they 
account for the largest part of overall composition effects, especially up to the 7th decile, 
for as long as the overall composition effects are negative. Their relative significance is 
much lower at the two highest wage deciles, where the key role is played by employer 
characteristics.
 26
The negative part of the skill composition effects appears to come primarily from 
the tenure variable. The negative tenure effects are, in turn, a good reflection of the 
decrease in the per capita levels of job-specific experience in the sample, at all but the last 
two wage deciles.
27 Tenure composition effects tend to decrease wages relatively more in 
the lower deciles with a consequent push towards higher wage inequality. In contrast, age 
effects do not have an equally noticeable contribution to the way the wage distribution 
evolved. The respective composition effects are smaller in magnitude and follow no 
regular pattern across the distribution.  
Education is the only skill that has had a positive composition effect at all wage 
deciles. However, had returns to education remained constant, the increase in educational 
attainment would have lead to wage increases across the broad but it would have also led 
to more wage inequality. Specifically, for the aggregate sample, the composition effect of 
education at the 9th wage decile is 2.90 times higher than that at the 1st decile. For males, 
the respective ratio is 2.93 and, for females, it is 1.74. This result is rather surprising, 
given that rising education increases the proportion of the skilled in the labour force and 
induces their relative wages to fall pushing towards lower wage inequality. However, 
there is another factor to consider. Wages tend to be more dispersed among high skilled 
workers and, therefore, rising education also pushes towards more wage inequality. 
Which effect dominates is an empirical issue. For the case of Greece in the period 1995-
2002 the evidence seems to be consistent with the latter effect being the dominant one. 
Our results are similar with the ones provided for Spain over the same period by 
                                                 
26 The disaggregation of the overall composition effect into its components reveals that it is mainly the 
aggregate employer/job composition effects that contribute to the wage increases at the upper deciles of the 
wage distribution. For the complete accounting of the decomposition results see Table A7 in the Appendix. 
27 The evolution of mean tenure by decile is presented in Figure A1 in the Appendix, along with all the 
(bootstrapped) mean employee characteristics (Xjt). 
  27Izquierdo and Lacuesta (2006) and for Portugal over 1986-1995 by Machado and Mata 
(2005).  
We turn now our focus on the price effects of skills. As already mentioned, 
aggregate price effects have had a significant contribution to overall wage changes, but 
their contribution to wage inequality has been relatively mild as they have been more 
equally spread across the distribution. However, if one looks at the price effects due to 
skill only observes a rather different picture. Evidently, even though overall price effects 
appear to have pushed wages upwards, the price effects due to skill, while smaller in 
magnitude than the skill composition effects, are also mostly negative (except for those at 
the 1
st and 9
th decile). Further, they tend to be larger in absolute value at the middle wage 
deciles.
 28  For clarity of exposition, Figure 3 plots the price effects due to education, 
general labour market experience of prime age adults (age > 24)
29 and job-specific 
experience (tenure) by decile and gender. Total skill price effects are also plotted, 
indicated by the shaded area. Noticeably, the total price effects of skills form a U-shaped 
pattern across the wage distribution.
 30  Thus, had the composition of skills remained 
constant the change in the returns to skills would tend to decrease the wages of almost all 
employees but mostly of those in the middle of the wage distribution. It was mentioned 
earlier that the increase in the overall wage inequality is driven mainly by the higher 
upper tail inequality and that the increases in the lower tail inequality were more 
contained. Obviously, the U-shaped pattern of skill return effects contributes to this 
pattern of wage inequality.  
                                                 
28 The disaggregation of the overall return effects into their components indicates that the constant mainly 
contributes to the observed wage increases. On the other hand, the return effects of employee and 
employer/job characteristics tend to decrease wages at most deciles. (see Table A7 in the Appendix). The 
fact that the effects of the constant seem to determine the sign of the overall return effects should not be 
considered surprising. Melly (2005) in his analysis for the US over the period 1973-1989 shows that the 
negative coefficient effects on the median wage change  are mainly due to the negative constant effect and 
not due to the sign of the return effects. 
29 In Tables 5a-5c the age return effects of both younger workers (age<25) and prime age adults (age>24) 
are presented and both are negative. In the Figures, though, we focus on the analysis of the price effects of 
prime age adults who are expected to have completed their education and be more permanently attached to 
the labour market (cf. Beaudry and Green, 2000). In any case, since the age return effects of younger 
workers are very small the thrust of the results would not change.   
30 This U-shaped pattern is also reflected in the changes of the estimated returns from the regressions over 
1995-2002 for most skill variables (see Figure A2 in the Appendix). Interestingly, our estimates of the 
changes in the returns to education over 1995-2002 differ from the equivalent estimates of Cholezas (2004) 
over 1994-1999. In contrast to our U-shaped pattern, Cholezas finds that changes in the returns to education 
increase monotonically when moving along the wage distribution. However, apart from the difference in 
the period under study, Choleza's findings are derived without controlling for employer characteristics. 
  28This pattern of return effects may be associated with a deteriorating market 
valuation of the skills of employees in the middle of the wage distribution relative to 
those of employees in the lower and upper part of the distribution. This U-shaped pattern 
can be considered as being broadly in line with the routinization hypothesis. The 
routization hypothesis refers to technical change that tends to substitute medium-skill 
jobs.  Therefore, the decreasing return to skills for the employees in the middle part of the 












































10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
quantile_
females
All skills Education Age Tenure
Graphs by sex
 
When men and women are examined separately the following interesting results 
emerge. For the sample of males the U-shape pattern is reinforced by a more pronounced 
positive part at the upper deciles of the distribution. For women the estimated price-
effects display a downward trend when moving along the wage distribution, with the 
price effects at the low and upper wage deciles keeping their advantage in comparison to 
the price effects in the middle of the distribution; however the positive price effects 
                                                 
31 A formal test of the routinization hypothesis would require an analysis of relative employment quantities.  
A direct test of any hypothesis is, however, beyond the purpose of the current study. 
  29observed for men at the upper deciles are not sustained. This could be taken as evidence 
of the so called ‘glass-ceiling’.
32   
However, the evolution of the aggregate skill price-effects across wage deciles only 
draws part of the picture. Equally important is to examine the evolution of the price 
effects of each skill separately. Interestingly, the U-shaped pattern is more or less 
sustained for all individual skill price effects. In all samples and deciles, the price effects 
of education and tenure are positive while the respective return effects of age are negative 
and relatively higher in absolute value. 
33 Thus, if the education and tenure distribution 
had remained constant the change in their returns would tend to increase wages. On the 
other hand, if the age composition of the labour force was held constant the change in the 
returns to age would tend to decrease wages.  
 Institutional changes that are effectively not age neutral is one of the explanations 
usually put forward in the literature for the deteriorating labour market outcomes of 
younger workers.
 34 Given that the employment relationships of older workers are more 
or less settled the new arrangements are likely to have influenced the evolution of 
earnings of younger workers more (see Rosolia and Torini, 2007 who provide an analysis 
for Italy).
  As mentioned in previous sections important changes relating mainly to 
employment contract arrangements have taken place in Greece the period under 
investigation.
 35 Therefore, changes in the institutional environment could possibly lie 
behind the observed negative age effects.   Interestingly, the age return effects are not 
uniform across the wage distribution and tend to be more negative for those in the middle 
                                                 
32 ‘Glass-ceiling’ refers to the situation where the labour market performance of women follows that of men 
up to a point after which their wages fall behind those of men (see Albrecht et. al., 2003 and Albrecht et. 
al., 2009). Positive return effects of skills, in the upper deciles, that are present only in the case of men 
could be a manifestation of this situation.  
33 We have also decomposed the age return effects of the prime age adults into their components and 
observed that the age return effects are negative for all age categories. However, for the younger workers 
(25-34) and those between 35-44 years of age the effects are, in most deciles, relatively more negative; 
interestingly, the U-shape pattern is driven to a large extent by these two age categories.  
34 In many countries institutional changes that aim at increasing labour market flexibility entail the 
inception of fixed-term contracts. The wages of employees working under temporary contracts are found to 
be on average lower than those of employees working under permanent contracts (eg. De la Rica and 
Felgueroso, 2003). Further, recent evidence for Portugal shows that temporary employment contracts tend 
to be concentrated to younger and less educated workers (Portugal and Varejao, 2009). 
35 Machado and Mata (2005) argue that changes in workers’ unobserved ability or in institutions may be 
reflected in coefficient changes. Arguably, in our case the age dummies may also capture, apart from 
returns to general labour market experience, unobserved characteristics of the workers in these age 
categories or institutional changes that have an impact on these worker categories.   
  30of the distribution. In relation to the shape of age return effects a supplementary to the 
routinization hypothesis explanation could be provided. In particular, the institutional 
changes that took place in Greece are not of the nature that would harm low wage 
earners, as minimum wages are still in effect and the system can be considered as being 
broadly regulated (see Du Caju et. al., 2008). However, the flexible employment contract 
arrangements in interaction with differences in unobserved labour market relevant skills 
may lead to divergent labour market outcomes for those in the middle and the upper part 
of the distribution.
36 In particular, any higher unobserved ability of those in the upper part 
of the distribution would tend to outweigh to some extent the impact of non-favourable 
institutional arrangements. 
5.4.  Economic developments  versus predetermined changes 
We have now seen the contribution of skills to wage-inequality in detail. But, how 
do these results inform us about the relative importance of economic developments and 
predetermined composition effects in shaping wage inequality the period under 
investigation? 
To examine the relative importance of economic developments we need to add to 
the skill price effects, which are undoubtedly influenced by market conditions, the part of 
the skill composition effects that could also be responsive to economic developments.  In 
the group of our skill-variables, we identify tenure as the only one whose composition 
effects are not strictly predetermined; in fact, we expect the market unresponsive part of 
tenure composition to be low.
37 For instance, tenure may be responsive to changes in the 
institutional environment that increase job mobility (i.e. inception of contracts of definite 
                                                 
36 Differences in unobserved labour quality have been frequently proposed as an explanation for wage 
differences between groups of workers. Bound and Johnson (1992) argue that unobserved labour quality in 
interaction with technical change can explain the change in the structure of wages in the US in the 1980s.  
In a similar reasoning, Albrecht et. al. (2009) argue that the low dispersion in labour market relevant skills 
in Sweden may lie behind the contained increases in wage inequality.   
37 One could of course argue that education and age composition may also be responsive to economic 
developments and market conditions. For instance, increasing returns to education could affect incentives 
and lead employees to acquire more education (e.g Acemoglou 2002). Further, an increase in the number of 
years devoted to education will in turn postpone the entry to the labour market; therefore, the age 
composition of the labour force may also be influenced. However, this is a process that is not instant and 
takes time. Given, the short time period covered by our sample it is not clear what part of the changes in 
education and age is exogenous and what part is responsive to economic developments. We prefer to treat 
age and education as exogenous and consider the responsive to economic developments skill effects 
obtained as a lower bound of the respective effects.  
  31length and contracts that relate to the completion of a specific task).
38 Further, a non 
negligible part of tenure composition effects is determined by the employers according to 
market conditions. In periods of high demand, we expect reduced firing to increase tenure 
and increased hiring to decrease it, and vice versa in periods of low demand.  
Hence, we aggregate the total price-effects of skill with the tenure composition 
effect and call it the responsive to market conditions and economic developments part of 
skill effects. Then, in Figure 4, we plot it against the sum of the skill composition effects 
that are exclusively attributable to predetermined demographic changes – education and 
age composition effects.  One can see that the responsive to economic developments skill 
effects are important in magnitude; in contrast, the predetermined skill composition 
effects are of relatively smaller scale. Interestingly, the U-shape pattern of return effects 
observed in Figure 3 is sustained with the addition of the tenure composition effects to 
the skill price-effects; it should be pointed though that the slightly positive skill price 
effects in the lower and upper deciles are now outweighed and a positive part is only 
present for males and only at the upper deciles.  
Figure 4 also plots the overall observed wage changes (indicated by the shaded 
area). This serves to illustrate another important point.  The skill effects attributable to 
economic developments have also contributed to the observed pattern of wage inequality, 
i.e. towards the upper-tail wage inequality and the wage-compression observed in the 
lower half of the distribution. Obviously, they tend to decrease more the wages of those 
in the middle of the distribution as compared to the wages of those in the lower and upper 
deciles.  
Another interesting point that emerges from Figure 4 is that skills, despite playing 
an important role in shaping the changes in the wage distribution over the period 1995-
2002, give only part of the picture. We need to also look into the effects that tend to 
outweigh the negative skill price and composition effects and contribute to the observed 
wage increases. It is the effect of the constant across the wage distribution and of the 
employer/job composition effects in the upper deciles that outweigh the negative skill 
                                                 
38 We have referred in the previous section to the possible impact of institutional changes on the pattern of 
age price effects. As mentioned here tenure levels may also be influenced by some of these institutional 
changes. In such case, the age price effects are likely to capture the impact of these institutional 
arrangements on wages that is beyond the one relating to tenure.  
  32price and composition effects making no allowance for extensive wage falls.   
Interestingly, the employer/job composition effects contribute also to the increases in the 
overall wage inequality. In particular, had the returns to employer and job characteristics 
remained constant their changing composition would tend to increase overall wage 
inequality, as they tend to decrease wages at low deciles and increase them at high deciles 
(see Table A7 in the Appendix). The fact that the employer/job characteristics are also 
very likely responsive to market conditions further reinforces the case for the importance 
of economic developments in influencing the pattern of wage changes. Conclusively, we 
are more inclined to side against the ‘revisionists’ view, in general, and the conclusion of 
Tsakloglou and Cholezas (2005) about Greece in particular, which assign economic 
developments a secondary role in the determination of wage inequality. 
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39 Christopoulou, Jimeno and Lamo (2010) in their analysis of  nine EU countries covering the same period 
and using the Structure of Earning Survey also find that economic developments are the most relevant in 
explaining the observed wage dynamics. 
  336. Conclusion 
In this paper we have examined how the distribution of wages has changed in 
Greece over 1995-2002 and what has been the contribution of skills to these changes. We 
have used a matched employer-employee dataset, which allowed us to control for both 
worker and job/employer heterogeneity. Building on the regression results, we used the 
Machado-Mata decomposition method to separate the part of the wage changes that is 
due to changes in the employer/job and workers characteristics from the part due to 
changes in the returns to these characteristics. Ultimately, this enabled us to analyse the 
contribution of the price and composition effects of each skill separately and join together 
the skill price effects and the part of the composition effects of skills that is responsive to 
market conditions. The latter exercise proves useful in our attempt to examine the relative 
importance of economic developments and predetermined compositional changes in 
shaping the observed changes in the wage distribution.  
The evidence suggests a small increase in Greek average wages combined with a 
significant increase in wage inequality, mostly due to significantly higher relative wage 
increases at the upper tail of the distribution. The contribution of skills to the evolution of 
Greek wage dynamics has been important. Briefly, the composition effects of skills are 
mostly negative. Their negative part is mainly due to the tenure composition effects 
which, by reducing wages more for those in the lower part of the wage distribution, 
contribute to the observed pattern of wage inequality. Markedly, the composition effects 
of education despite being positive also contribute to higher wage inequality. This result 
contradicts standard expectations for a negative relationship between rising education and 
wage equality and it is possibly the outcome of higher wage dispersion among the high 
skilled.   
The price effects due to skill have also been mostly negative but their magnitude is 
relatively smaller. Interestingly, they have formed a U-shaped pattern along the wage 
distribution. This U-shaped pattern of skill price effects, though not a proof of, can be 
considered as being broadly in line with the routinization hypothesis; a variant of the of 
skill-biased technical change theory. As to the individual skill price effects, tenure and 
education price effects are positive and the negative part of the skill price effects is 
  34mainly due to the age price effects. The sign and shape of the age price effects could be 
regarded as being the outcome of the interaction between institutional changes that are 
not age neutral and different unobserved ability of employees along the wage distribution.  
 Noticeably, it is the effects of the constant across the wage distribution and of the 
employer/job composition effects in the upper deciles of the wage distribution that 
outweigh the negative skill price and composition effects making no allowance for 
extensive wage falls. In interpreting our decomposition results we can argue that 
economic developments, through their combined influence on the price effects of skills 
and the market driven part of the skill composition effects have had an important role in 
shaping Greek wage dynamics. On the other hand, the skill effects that are attributable to 
predetermined compositional changes were of relatively smaller scale.  
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  38A Appendix 
Table A1: OLS and quantile estimation results, Sample: all, Year: 1995 
                                                                             Quantile estimations  OLS 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Specification 1 
Min.  years  of  education  0.0333 0.0216 0.0242 0.0266 0.0285 0.0311 0.0336 0.0362 0.0390 0.0426 
[0.0004]*** [0.0004]*** [0.0004]*** [0.0004]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0009]*** 
Vocational  degree  0.0678 0.0879 0.0879 0.0799 0.0831 0.0804 0.0761 0.0652 0.0498 0.0334 
[0.0060]*** [0.0068]*** [0.0065]*** [0.0060]*** [0.0071]*** [0.0075]*** [0.0076]*** [0.0084]*** [0.0095]*** [0.0114]*** 
Age:15-24  years  old  -0.2806 -0.1407 -0.1608 -0.1907 -0.2239 -0.2530 -0.2792 -0.3050 -0.3381 -0.4094 
[0.0086]*** [0.0096]*** [0.0092]*** [0.0086]*** [0.0101]*** [0.0107]*** [0.0109]*** [0.0121]*** [0.0138]*** [0.0168]*** 
Age:25-34  years  old  -0.1258 -0.0636 -0.0701 -0.0789 -0.0975 -0.1104 -0.1216 -0.1388 -0.1433 -0.1693 
[0.0064]*** [0.0072]*** [0.0070]*** [0.0064]*** [0.0076]*** [0.0081]*** [0.0082]*** [0.0092]*** [0.0105]*** [0.0127]*** 
Age:35-44  years  old  0.0051 0.0378 0.0381 0.0397 0.0223 0.0154 0.0081 -0.0019  -0.0013  -0.0181 
[0.0061] [0.0068]***  [0.0065]***  [0.0060]***  [0.0072]***  [0.0076]**  [0.0077] [0.0085] [0.0097] [0.0117] 
Age:45-54  years  old  0.0475 0.0519 0.0605 0.0613 0.0535 0.0509 0.0476 0.0422 0.0426 0.0402 
[0.0060]*** [0.0068]*** [0.0065]*** [0.0060]*** [0.0070]*** [0.0075]*** [0.0076]*** [0.0084]*** [0.0095]*** [0.0113]*** 
Tenure  in  years  0.0267 0.0283 0.0286 0.0288 0.0290 0.0291 0.0283 0.0283 0.0259 0.0213 
[0.0007]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0013]*** 
Tenure  squared/100  -0.0283 -0.0307 -0.0284 -0.0286 -0.0290 -0.0297 -0.0276 -0.0310 -0.0265 -0.0204 
[0.0023]*** [0.0028]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0028]*** [0.0030]*** [0.0030]*** [0.0033]*** [0.0037]*** [0.0044]*** 
Sex:  female  -0.1799 -0.1002 -0.1248 -0.1446 -0.1594 -0.1773 -0.1916 -0.2122 -0.2404 -0.2674 
[0.0032]*** [0.0037]*** [0.0035]*** [0.0032]*** [0.0037]*** [0.0040]*** [0.0040]*** [0.0044]*** [0.0049]*** [0.0059]*** 
Constant  1.4314 1.1521 1.2213 1.2764 1.3395 1.3936 1.4550 1.5290 1.6302 1.8066 
[0.0074]*** [0.0077]*** [0.0076]*** [0.0072]*** [0.0086]*** [0.0092]*** [0.0094]*** [0.0104]*** [0.0118]*** [0.0140]*** 
Observations  38071 38071 38071 38071 38071 38071 38071 38071 38071 38071 
R-squared 0.47 
Specification 2 
Min.  years  of  education  0.0173 0.0122 0.0137 0.0150 0.0157 0.0164 0.0164 0.0177 0.0184 0.0194 
[0.0006]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0012]*** 
Vocational  degree  0.0643 0.0549 0.0551 0.0645 0.0686 0.0692 0.0705 0.0745 0.0607 0.0727 
[0.0057]*** [0.0076]*** [0.0072]*** [0.0061]*** [0.0060]*** [0.0064]*** [0.0069]*** [0.0072]*** [0.0082]*** [0.0120]*** 
Age:15-24  years  old  -0.2202 -0.1249 -0.1540 -0.1679 -0.1796 -0.1874 -0.2082 -0.2284 -0.2596 -0.2953 
[0.0078]*** [0.0103]*** [0.0098]*** [0.0083]*** [0.0082]*** [0.0087]*** [0.0094]*** [0.0098]*** [0.0113]*** [0.0166]*** 
Age:25-34  years  old  -0.1031 -0.0604 -0.0692 -0.0751 -0.0824 -0.0829 -0.0947 -0.1088 -0.1191 -0.1363 
[0.0059]*** [0.0076]*** [0.0074]*** [0.0062]*** [0.0062]*** [0.0065]*** [0.0070]*** [0.0075]*** [0.0086]*** [0.0126]*** 
Age:35-44    years  old  0.0100 0.0345 0.0279 0.0236 0.0174 0.0211 0.0141 0.0067 -0.0022  -0.0107 
[0.0055]*  [0.0072]*** [0.0069]*** [0.0059]*** [0.0058]*** [0.0061]*** [0.0066]**  [0.0069]  [0.0079]  [0.0116] 
Age:45-54    years  old  0.0420 0.0533 0.0492 0.0447 0.0423 0.0472 0.0389 0.0363 0.0295 0.0259 
[0.0054]*** [0.0072]*** [0.0069]*** [0.0058]*** [0.0057]*** [0.0060]*** [0.0065]*** [0.0068]*** [0.0078]*** [0.0113]** 
Tenure  in  years  0.0221 0.0228 0.0234 0.0237 0.0233 0.0226 0.0221 0.0208 0.0194 0.0171 
[0.0006]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0013]*** 
Tenure  squared/100  -0.0197 -0.0209 -0.0205 -0.0203 -0.0183 -0.0159 -0.0155 -0.0144 -0.0148 -0.0137 
[0.0021]*** [0.0030]*** [0.0028]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0027]*** [0.0030]*** [0.0045]*** 
Sex:  female  -0.1513 -0.0876 -0.1100 -0.1239 -0.1354 -0.1487 -0.1594 -0.1725 -0.1889 -0.2059 
[0.0031]*** [0.0044]*** [0.0041]*** [0.0034]*** [0.0033]*** [0.0034]*** [0.0037]*** [0.0038]*** [0.0043]*** [0.0062]*** 
Constant  1.6430 1.3550 1.4441 1.4700 1.4914 1.6031 1.6843 1.7810 1.8638 2.0734 
[0.0346]*** [0.0436]*** [0.0433]*** [0.0369]*** [0.0360]*** [0.0381]*** [0.0407]*** [0.0432]*** [0.0491]*** [0.0690]*** 
Observations  37901 37901 37901 37901 37901 37901 37901 37901 37901 37901 
R-squared  0.58                       
Notes: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in brackets. Specification 1 controls only for the individual characteristics listed. 
Specification 2 also controls for observable employer and job characteristics, namely: sector, occupation, firm ownership, region, firm size, main product market and level of 
collective agreement coverage. 
  39Table A2: OLS and quantile estimation results, Sample: all, Year: 2002 
 
                                                                            Quantile estimations  OLS 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Specification 1 
Min.  years  of  education  0.0498 0.0335 0.0377 0.0416 0.0450 0.0473 0.0500 0.0525 0.0551 0.0602 
[0.0005]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0011]*** 
Vocational  degree  -0.0462 -0.0045 -0.0296 -0.0428 -0.0512 -0.0457 -0.0504 -0.0527 -0.0598 -0.0614 
[0.0057]*** [0.0077]  [0.0061]*** [0.0062]*** [0.0062]*** [0.0060]*** [0.0075]*** [0.0076]*** [0.0086]*** [0.0104]*** 
Age:15-24  years  old  -0.3486 -0.1722 -0.1989 -0.2298 -0.2813 -0.3321 -0.3796 -0.4140 -0.4776 -0.5348 
[0.0094]*** [0.0126]*** [0.0100]*** [0.0102]*** [0.0103]*** [0.0098]*** [0.0124]*** [0.0127]*** [0.0144]*** [0.0173]*** 
Age:25-34  years  old  -0.2141 -0.1011 -0.1211 -0.1429 -0.1774 -0.2068 -0.2404 -0.2540 -0.2851 -0.3153 
[0.0078]*** [0.0103]*** [0.0082]*** [0.0084]*** [0.0085]*** [0.0081]*** [0.0103]*** [0.0105]*** [0.0119]*** [0.0144]*** 
Age:35-44    years  old  -0.0699 -0.0238 -0.0228 -0.0231 -0.0376 -0.0581 -0.0779 -0.0833 -0.1132 -0.1313 
[0.0075]*** [0.0100]**  [0.0080]*** [0.0081]*** [0.0082]*** [0.0079]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0101]*** [0.0114]*** [0.0138]*** 
Age:45-54  years old  -0.0111  0.0354  0.0372  0.0323  0.0132  -0.0081  -0.0249  -0.0321  -0.0534  -0.0601 
[0.0073]  [0.0099]*** [0.0078]*** [0.0080]*** [0.0080]*  [0.0078]  [0.0097]**  [0.0098]*** [0.0110]*** [0.0133]*** 
Tenure  in  years  0.0299 0.0315 0.0300 0.0300 0.0301 0.0308 0.0307 0.0303 0.0295 0.0269 
[0.0006]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0011]*** 
Tenure  squared/100  -0.0216 -0.0239 -0.0107 -0.0079 -0.0085 -0.0137 -0.0188 -0.0230 -0.0282 -0.0314 
[0.0023]*** [0.0034]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0026]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0030]*** [0.0031]*** [0.0035]*** [0.0042]*** 
Sex:  female  -0.1559 -0.0973 -0.1131 -0.1262 -0.1395 -0.1479 -0.1585 -0.1704 -0.1896 -0.2201 
[0.0034]*** [0.0047]*** [0.0037]*** [0.0037]*** [0.0037]*** [0.0035]*** [0.0044]*** [0.0045]*** [0.0050]*** [0.0061]*** 
Constant  1.3589 1.0599 1.1351 1.1903 1.2575 1.3330 1.4161 1.5016 1.6273 1.7845 
[0.0088]*** [0.0111]*** [0.0089]*** [0.0092]*** [0.0094]*** [0.0092]*** [0.0117]*** [0.0119]*** [0.0135]*** [0.0161]*** 
Observations  41449  41449  41449  41449  41449  41449  41449  41449  41449  41449 
R-squared 0.53 
Specification 2 
Min.  years  of  education  0.0204 0.0162 0.0174 0.0180 0.0184 0.0186 0.0192 0.0201 0.0212 0.0223 
[0.0007]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0014]*** 
Vocational  degree  -0.0101 -0.0053 -0.0080 -0.0115 -0.0093 -0.0102 -0.0122 -0.0129 -0.0216 -0.0194 
[0.0052]*  [0.0063]  [0.0057]  [0.0052]** [0.0055]*  [0.0049]** [0.0060]** [0.0060]** [0.0071]***  [0.0108]* 
Age:15-24  years  old  -0.3000 -0.1552 -0.2030 -0.2230 -0.2443 -0.2608 -0.2894 -0.3055 -0.3453 -0.3907 
[0.0084]*** [0.0101]*** [0.0091]*** [0.0083]*** [0.0089]*** [0.0079]*** [0.0099]*** [0.0099]*** [0.0115]*** [0.0179]*** 
Age:25-34  years  old  -0.1864 -0.0900 -0.1305 -0.1423 -0.1558 -0.1659 -0.1798 -0.1881 -0.2073 -0.2141 
[0.0069]*** [0.0082]*** [0.0075]*** [0.0068]*** [0.0073]*** [0.0065]*** [0.0081]*** [0.0082]*** [0.0095]*** [0.0147]*** 
Age:35-44  years  old  -0.0629 -0.0143 -0.0406 -0.0424 -0.0519 -0.0525 -0.0591 -0.0630 -0.0685 -0.0625 
[0.0067]*** [0.0080]*  [0.0072]*** [0.0066]*** [0.0071]*** [0.0063]*** [0.0078]*** [0.0078]*** [0.0091]*** [0.0140]*** 
Age:45-54  years  old  -0.0163 0.0201  -0.0010 -0.0006 -0.0065 -0.0107 -0.0193 -0.0242 -0.0260 -0.0203 
[0.0065]** [0.0077]***  [0.0070]  [0.0064]  [0.0068]  [0.0061]*  [0.0076]** [0.0076]***  [0.0089]***  [0.0136] 
Tenure  in  years  0.0228 0.0295 0.0270 0.0250 0.0240 0.0227 0.0224 0.0213 0.0199 0.0174 
[0.0006]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0007]*** [0.00086]***  [0.0012]*** 
Tenure  squared/100  -0.0184 -0.0334 -0.0239 -0.0167 -0.0149 -0.0119 -0.0124 -0.0116 -0.0113 -0.0087 
[0.0021]*** [0.0025]*** [0.0023]*** [0.0021]*** [0.0022]*** [0.0019]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0024]*** [0.0028]*** [0.0044]** 
Sex:  female  -0.1242 -0.0745 -0.0803 -0.0881 -0.1020 -0.1107 -0.1229 -0.1345 -0.1536 -0.1831 
[0.0032]*** [0.0040]*** [0.0036]*** [0.0032]*** [0.0034]*** [0.0030]*** [0.0037]*** [0.0037]*** [0.0041]*** [0.0066]*** 
Constant  1.7875 1.3543 1.4882 1.5625 1.6458 1.7302 1.8099 1.8759 2.1417  2.2502 
[0.0332]*** [0.0395]*** [0.0358]*** [0.0326]*** [0.0348]*** [0.0309]*** [0.0386]*** [0.0386]*** [0.0448]*** [0.0692]*** 
Observations  41449  41449  41449  41449  41449  41449  41449  41449  41449  41449 
R-squared 0.63 
Notes: as in Table A1. 
  40Table A3: OLS and quantile estimation results, Sample: males, Year: 1995 
             
                                                                            Quantile estimations  OLS 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Specification 1 
Min.  years  of  education  0.0316 0.0230 0.0244 0.0257 0.0278 0.0296 0.0316 0.0340 0.0352 0.0382 
[0.0005]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0007]*** [0.00086]***  [0.0010]*** [0.0012]***
Vocational  degree  0.0652 0.0825 0.0848 0.0766 0.0804 0.0810 0.0720 0.0558 0.0421 0.0298 
[0.0066]*** [0.0080]*** [0.0085]*** [0.0078]*** [0.0077]*** [0.0078]*** [0.0087]*** [0.0100]*** [0.0114]*** [0.0133]** 
Age:15-24  years  old  -0.3391 -0.1738 -0.2154 -0.2436 -0.2806 -0.3150 -0.3567 -0.4006 -0.4440 -0.5306 
[0.0117]*** [0.0142]*** [0.0150]*** [0.0138]*** [0.0137]*** [0.0140]*** [0.0155]*** [0.0179]*** [0.0207]*** [0.0242]***
Age:25-34  years  old  -0.1529 -0.0807 -0.0929 -0.1119 -0.1311 -0.1506 -0.1646 -0.1844 -0.1921 -0.2194 
[0.0078]*** [0.0093]*** [0.0099]*** [0.0091]*** [0.0091]*** [0.0093]*** [0.0103]*** [0.0120]*** [0.0139]*** [0.0163]***
Age:35-44  years old  -0.0056  0.0351  0.0321  0.0257  0.0044  -0.0066  -0.0147  -0.0256  -0.0247  -0.0331 
[0.0072]  [0.0088]*** [0.0093]*** [0.0085]*** [0.0084]  [0.0086]  [0.0095]  [0.0109]**  [0.0127]*  [0.0148]** 
Age:45-54    years  old  0.0531 0.0599 0.0669 0.0672 0.0547 0.0511 0.0507 0.0468 0.0494 0.0459 
[0.0070]*** [0.0086]*** [0.0091]*** [0.0083]*** [0.0082]*** [0.0084]*** [0.0092]*** [0.0106]*** [0.0122]*** [0.0142]***
Tenure  in  years  0.0265 0.0317 0.0311 0.0302 0.0307 0.0299 0.0282 0.0267 0.0232 0.0173 
[0.0008]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0013]*** [0.0015]*** [0.0017]***
Tenure  squared/100  -0.0307 -0.0417 -0.0374 -0.0357 -0.0379 -0.0369 -0.0332 -0.0315 -0.0249 -0.0147 
[0.0029]*** [0.0038]*** [0.0039]*** [0.0035]*** [0.0034]*** [0.0035]*** [0.0038]*** [0.0044]*** [0.0051]*** [0.0059]** 
Constant  1.4696 1.1286 1.2191 1.2989 1.3634 1.4348 1.5100 1.5952 1.7211 1.9077 
[0.0091]*** [0.0104]*** [0.0114]*** [0.0107]*** [0.0107]*** [0.0109]*** [0.0120]*** [0.01387]***  [0.0157]*** [0.0179]***
Observations  25994  25994  25994  25994  25994  25994  25994  25994  25994  25994 
R-squared 0.40 
          
Specification 2 
Min.  years  of  education  0.0166 0.0127 0.0131 0.0148 0.0158 0.0152 0.0158 0.0159 0.0175 0.0189 
[0.0007]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0014]***
Vocational  degree  0.0614 0.0521 0.0549 0.0635 0.0668 0.0640 0.0668 0.0626 0.0633 0.0560 
[0.0063]*** [0.0077]*** [0.0076]*** [0.0063]*** [0.0073]*** [0.0070]*** [0.0069]*** [0.0074]*** [0.0093]*** [0.0127]***
Age:15-24  years  old  -0.2713 -0.1503 -0.1824 -0.2004 -0.2185 -0.2355 -0.2704 -0.3059 -0.3418 -0.4120 
[0.0105]*** [0.0127]*** [0.0128]*** [0.0106]*** [0.0122]*** [0.0117]*** [0.0116]*** [0.0125]*** [0.0158]*** [0.0216]***
Age:25-34  years  old  -0.1287 -0.0875 -0.0877 -0.1017 -0.1052 -0.1109 -0.1264 -0.1359 -0.1475 -0.1770 
[0.0070]*** [0.0082]*** [0.0084]*** [0.0070]*** [0.0081]*** [0.0078]*** [0.0078]*** [0.0084]*** [0.0106]*** [0.0145]***
Age:35-44  years  old  -0.0016  0.0215 0.0188 0.0134 0.0075 0.0060 0.0032 -0.0016  -0.0101  -0.0240 
[0.0065] [0.0078]***  [0.0078]**  [0.0065]**  [0.0075] [0.0072] [0.0071] [0.0077] [0.0096] [0.0131]* 
Age:45-54  years  old  0.0452 0.0569 0.0576 0.0488 0.0477 0.0488 0.0466 0.0412 0.0332 0.0354 
[0.0063]*** [0.0077]*** [0.0077]*** [0.0063]*** [0.0073]*** [0.0070]*** [0.0069]*** [0.0074]*** [0.0092]*** [0.0126]***
Tenure  in  years  0.0224 0.0237 0.0249 0.0247 0.0251 0.0244 0.0239 0.0218 0.0192 0.0152 
[0.0008]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0016]***
Tenure  squared/100  -0.0233 -0.0240 -0.0264 -0.0252 -0.0264 -0.0252 -0.0253 -0.0208 -0.0169 -0.0123 
[0.0026]*** [0.0033]*** [0.0033]*** [0.0027]*** [0.0031]*** [0.0029]*** [0.0029]*** [0.0031]*** [0.0039]*** [0.0054]** 
Constant  1.6815 1.3497 1.3808 1.4119 1.5052 1.5677 1.7074 1.8968 2.0053  2.1575 
[0.0582]*** [0.0697]*** [0.0696]*** [0.0576]*** [0.0663]*** [0.0635]*** [0.0626]*** [0.0674]*** [0.0842]*** [0.1157]***
Observations  25882  25882  25882  25882  25882  25882  25882  25882  25882  25882 
R-squared  0.53           
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Table A4: OLS and quantile estimation results, Sample: males, Year: 2002 
                                                                            Quantile estimations  OLS 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Specification 1 
Min.  years  of  education  0.0490 0.0345 0.0383 0.0417 0.0452 0.0464 0.0491 0.0515 0.0539 0.0579 
[0.0007]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0007]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0014]*** 
Vocational  degree  -0.0527 -0.0172 -0.0349 -0.0449 -0.0572 -0.0529 -0.0568 -0.0591 -0.0712 -0.0845 
[0.0067]*** [0.0086]**  [0.0080]*** [0.0078]*** [0.0076]*** [0.0076]*** [0.0089]*** [0.0086]*** [0.0091]*** [0.0126]*** 
Age:15-24  years  old  -0.3965 -0.1837 -0.2237 -0.2564 -0.3091 -0.3652 -0.4267 -0.4783 -0.5557 -0.6599 
[0.0122]*** [0.0153]*** [0.0142]*** [0.0140]*** [0.0137]*** [0.0138]*** [0.0162]*** [0.0157]*** [0.0167]*** [0.0233]*** 
Age:25-34  years  old  -0.2453 -0.1201 -0.1441 -0.1597 -0.1977 -0.2337 -0.2754 -0.2944 -0.3305 -0.3756 
[0.0095]*** [0.0117]*** [0.0109]*** [0.0108]*** [0.0106]*** [0.0106]*** [0.0125]*** [0.0126]*** [0.0130]*** [0.0182]*** 
Age:35-44    years  old  -0.0740 -0.0286 -0.0267 -0.0215 -0.0419 -0.0649 -0.0829 -0.0894 -0.1168 -0.1405 
[0.0091]*** [0.0113]**  [0.0105]**  [0.0104]**  [0.0102]*** [0.0102]*** [0.0120]*** [0.0116]*** [0.0123]*** [0.0172]*** 
Age:45-54  years old  -0.0045  0.0497  0.0472  0.0431  0.0245  0.0038  -0.0144  -0.0280  -0.0518  -0.0641 
[0.0087] [0.0109]***  [0.0101]***  [0.0100]***  [0.0097]**  [0.0097] [0.0114] [0.0110]**  [0.0117]***  [0.0163]*** 
Tenure  in  years  0.0285 0.0314 0.0311 0.0311 0.0315 0.0310 0.0299 0.0293 0.0274 0.0225 
[0.0008]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0016]*** 
Tenure  squared/100  -0.0193 -0.0199 -0.0127 -0.0113 -0.0147 -0.0177 -0.0205 -0.0242 -0.0263 -0.0243 
[0.0029]*** [0.0040]*** [0.0036]*** [0.0034]*** [0.0033]*** [0.0033]*** [0.0038]*** [0.0037]*** [0.0039]*** [0.0055]*** 
Constant  1.3888 1.0507 1.1330 1.1909 1.2608 1.3579 1.4513 1.5417 1.6788 1.8715 
[0.0109]*** [0.0130]*** [0.0123]*** [0.0123]*** [0.0121]*** [0.0123]*** [0.0145]*** [0.0139]*** [0.0147]*** [0.0203]*** 
Observations  25964  25964  25964  25964  25964  25964  25964  25964  25964  25964 
R-squared 0.52 
Specification 2 
Min.  years  of  education  0.0208 0.0165 0.0168 0.0183 0.0184 0.0191 0.0195 0.0209 0.0217 0.0223 
[0.0008]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0015]*** 
Vocational  degree  -0.0124 -0.0123 -0.0146 -0.0116 -0.0128 -0.0095 -0.0104 -0.0184 -0.0239 -0.0202 
[0.0063]**  [0.0082] [0.0067]**  [0.0067]*  [0.0069]*  [0.0073] [0.0067] [0.0074]**  [0.0092]***  [0.0116]* 
Age:15-24  years  old  -0.3346 -0.1822 -0.2342 -0.2486 -0.2839 -0.3012 -0.3179 -0.3507 -0.3895 -0.4229 
[0.0110]*** [0.0142]*** [0.0115]*** [0.0117]*** [0.0120]*** [0.0128]*** [0.0118]*** [0.0130***  [0.0163]*** [0.0208]*** 
Age:25-34  years  old  -0.2141 -0.1111 -0.1552 -0.1634 -0.1860 -0.2022 -0.2115 -0.2249 -0.2441 -0.2434 
[0.0085]*** [0.0108]*** [0.0088]*** [0.0090]*** [0.0092]*** [0.0099]*** [0.0091]*** [0.0101]*** [0.0126]*** [0.0162]*** 
Age:35-44  years  old  -0.0685 -0.0254 -0.0470 -0.0473 -0.0578 -0.0618 -0.0637 -0.0718 -0.0760 -0.0621 
[0.0081]*** [0.0105]**  [0.0085]*** [0.0087]*** [0.0089]*** [0.0095]*** [0.0087]*** [0.0096]*** [0.0120]*** [0.0152]*** 
Age:45-54  years  old  -0.0165 0.0215  0.0004  0.0052  -0.0048 -0.0129 -0.0202 -0.0241 -0.0289 -0.0189 
[0.0077]**  [0.0099]**  [0.0081] [0.0082] [0.0084] [0.0090] [0.0083]**  [0.0091]***  [0.0114]**  [0.0144] 
Tenure  in  years  0.0216 0.0282 0.0267 0.0255 0.0242 0.0232 0.0227 0.0211 0.0192 0.0162 
[0.0007]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0014]*** 
Tenure  squared/100  -0.0165 -0.0281 -0.0239 -0.0210 -0.0191 -0.0170 -0.0165 -0.0143 -0.0109 -0.0074 
[0.0026]*** [0.0034]*** [0.0028]*** [0.0028]*** [0.0028]*** [0.0030]*** [0.0028]*** [0.0031]*** [0.0039]*** [0.0049] 
Constant  1.8026 1.3386 1.4204 1.5307 1.6210 1.8157 1.8786 1.9067 2.2022  2.2230 
[0.0490]*** [0.0578]*** [0.0495]*** [0.0512]*** [0.0528]*** [0.0565]*** [0.0520]*** [0.0567]*** [0.0658]*** [0.0828]*** 
Observations  25964  25964  25964  25964  25964  25964  25964  25964  25964  25964 
R-squared 0.62 
Notes: as in Table A1. 
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Table A5: OLS and quantile estimation results, Sample: females, Year: 1995 
 
             
                                                                            Quantile estimations  OLS 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Specification 1 
Min.  years  of  education  0.0360 0.0161 0.0204 0.0242 0.0273 0.0320 0.0346 0.0376 0.0428 0.0501 
[0.0007]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0005]*** [0.0006]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0019]***
Vocational  degree  0.1027 0.0942 0.0878 0.1216 0.1121 0.1057 0.1181 0.1096 0.0870 0.0808 
[0.0210]*** [0.0236]*** [0.0166]*** [0.0189]*** [0.0225]*** [0.0242]*** [0.0256]*** [0.0278]*** [0.0286]*** [0.0470]* 
Age:15-24  years  old  -0.1971 -0.0843 -0.1041 -0.1259 -0.1594 -0.1830 -0.1780 -0.2000 -0.2187 -0.3010 
[0.0143]*** [0.0161]*** [0.0115]*** [0.0128]*** [0.0154]*** [0.0166]*** [0.0177]*** [0.0193]*** [0.0202]*** [0.0335]***
Age:25-34  years  old  -0.0580 -0.0140 -0.0131 -0.0216 -0.0297 -0.0449 -0.0355 -0.0491 -0.0545 -0.0949 
[0.01278]***  [0.0142]  [0.0102]  [0.0114]*  [0.0137]** [0.0147]***  [0.0157]** [0.0171]***  [0.0178]***  [0.0295]***
Age:35-44    years  old  0.0526 0.0525 0.0676 0.0737 0.0660 0.0609 0.0739 0.0673 0.0661 0.0259 
[0.0122]*** [0.0138]*** [0.0099]*** [0.0110]*** [0.0132]*** [0.0142]*** [0.0150]*** [0.0163]*** [0.0169]*** [0.0278] 
Age:45-54    years  old  0.0562 0.0373 0.0582 0.0668 0.0589 0.0660 0.0710 0.0637 0.0673 0.0380 
[0.0125]*** [0.0142]*** [0.0101]*** [0.0113]*** [0.0135]*** [0.0145]*** [0.0154]*** [0.0166]*** [0.0172]*** [0.0282] 
Tenure  in  years  0.0245 0.0236 0.0243 0.0255 0.0244 0.0246 0.0247 0.0257 0.0256 0.0221 
[0.0011]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0013]*** [0.0013]*** [0.0015]*** [0.0015]*** [0.0024]***
Tenure  squared/100  -0.0149 -0.0217 -0.0143 -0.0142 -0.0079 -0.0070 -0.0066 -0.0116 -0.0173 -0.0134 
[0.0044]*** [0.0051]*** [0.0036]*** [0.0040]*** [0.0048]*  [0.0051]  [0.0054]  [0.0058]**  [0.0059]*** [0.0095] 
Constant  1.1761 1.1117 1.1169 1.1260 1.1588 1.1708 1.1913 1.2325 1.2706 1.3881 
[0.0136]*** [0.0147]*** [0.0105]*** [0.0118]*** [0.0144]*** [0.0157]*** [0.0169]*** [0.0184]*** [0.0191]*** [0.0308]***
Observations  12077 12077 12077 12077 12077 12077 12077 12077 12077 12077 
R-squared 0.43 
          
Specification 2 
Min.  years  of  education  0.0151 0.0089 0.0093 0.0103 0.0112 0.0125 0.0138 0.0148 0.0159 0.0183 
[0.0010]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0013]*** [0.0016]*** [0.0019]***
Vocational  degree  0.0681 0.0295 0.0226 0.0518 0.0624 0.0771 0.0876 0.0896 0.0586 0.0962 
[0.0186]*** [0.0212]  [0.0211]  [0.0220]**  [0.0175]*** [0.0214]*** [0.0204]*** [0.0242]*** [0.0288]**  [0.0353]***
Age:15-24  years  old  -0.1493 -0.0914 -0.0913 -0.1116 -0.1193 -0.1295 -0.1337 -0.1382 -0.1490 -0.2126 
[0.0127]*** [0.0145]*** [0.0145]*** [0.0150]*** [0.0120]*** [0.0147]*** [0.0142]*** [0.0169]*** [0.0201]*** [0.0251]***
Age:25-34  years  old  -0.0405 -0.0077 -0.0056 -0.0143 -0.0202 -0.0293 -0.0360 -0.0388 -0.0406 -0.0748 
[0.0113]***  [0.0129] [0.0128] [0.0133] [0.0107]*  [0.0131]**  [0.0126]***  [0.0149]***  [0.0178]**  [0.0219]***
Age:35-44  years  old  0.0524 0.0648 0.0667 0.0568 0.0561 0.0544 0.0503 0.0479 0.0486 0.0133 
[0.0108]*** [0.0124]*** [0.0124]*** [0.0129]*** [0.0103]*** [0.0125]*** [0.0120]*** [0.0142]*** [0.0168]*** [0.0204] 
Age:45-54  years  old  0.0480 0.0430 0.0520 0.0482 0.0511 0.0471 0.0405 0.0464 0.0468 0.0183 
[0.0110]*** [0.0127]*** [0.0127]*** [0.0132]*** [0.0105]*** [0.0127]*** [0.0122]*** [0.0144]*** [0.0170]*** [0.0206] 
Tenure  in  years  0.0188 0.0239 0.0212 0.0195 0.0191 0.0182 0.0176 0.0172 0.0152 0.0121 
[0.0010]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0013]*** [0.0015]*** [0.0019]***
Tenure  squared/100  -0.0063 -0.0323 -0.0162 -0.0060 -0.0056 -0.0009 0.0023  0.0025  0.0118  0.0165 
[0.0040] [0.0045]***  [0.0044]***  [0.0047] [0.0037] [0.0046] [0.0043] [0.0051] [0.0060]**  [0.0074]** 
Constant  1.4723 1.3263 1.3571 1.3595 1.4001 1.4654 1.5310 1.5905 1.6070 1.7782 
[0.0390]*** [0.0424]*** [0.0446]*** [0.0458]*** [0.0369]*** [0.0447]*** [0.0427]*** [0.0499]*** [0.0600]*** [0.0697]***
Observations  12019 12019 12019 12019 12019 12019 12019 12019 12019 12019 
R-squared 0.57 
Notes: as in Table A1. 
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Table A6: OLS and quantile estimation results, Sample: females, Year: 2002 
 
 
             
                                                                            Quantile estimations  OLS 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
Specification 1 
Min.  years  of  education  0.0497 0.0307 0.0341 0.0380 0.0430 0.0455 0.0504 0.0517 0.0549 0.0606 
[0.0009]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0008]*** [0.00071]***  [0.0009]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0015]*** [0.0017]***
Vocational  degree  -0.0225 0.0121  -0.0148 -0.0314 -0.0346 -0.0300 -0.0348 -0.0401 -0.0353 0.0061 
[0.0111]** [0.0133]  [0.0113]  [0.00991]***  [0.0113]***  [0.0131]** [0.0138]** [0.0134]***  [0.0167]** [0.0185] 
Age:15-24  years  old  -0.2834 -0.1571 -0.1660 -0.1977 -0.2599 -0.2895 -0.3239 -0.3359 -0.3476 -0.4266 
[0.0161]*** [0.0193]*** [0.0167]*** [0.01421]***  [0.0164]*** [0.0189]*** [0.0200]*** [0.0195]*** [0.0245]*** [0.0273]***
Age:25-34  years  old  -0.1613 -0.0804 -0.0894 -0.1108 -0.1516 -0.1592 -0.1935 -0.1920 -0.1921 -0.2282 
[0.0145]*** [0.0175]*** [0.0147]*** [0.0129]*** [0.0148]*** [0.0171]*** [0.0180]*** [0.0176]*** [0.0220]*** [0.0243]***
Age:35-44    years  old  -0.0507 -0.0151 -0.0123 -0.0150 -0.0362 -0.0360 -0.0650 -0.0622 -0.0631 -0.0995 
[0.0142]***  [0.0171] [0.0144] [0.0126] [0.0144]**  [0.0167]**  [0.0175]***  [0.0171]***  [0.0213]***  [0.0235]***
Age:45-54  years old  -0.0148  0.0078  0.0149  0.0156  -0.0140  -0.0149  -0.0381  -0.0281  -0.0141  -0.0419 
[0.01448]  [0.0172] [0.0146] [0.0128] [0.0147] [0.0170] [0.0178]**  [0.0173] [0.0217] [0.0239]* 
Tenure  in  years  0.0313 0.0328 0.0302 0.0286 0.0281 0.0283 0.0288 0.0296 0.0281 0.0267 
[0.0010]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0013]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0015]*** [0.0017]***
Tenure  squared/100  -0.0251 -0.0406 -0.0247 -0.0112 -0.0029 -0.0023 -0.0042 -0.0112 -0.0114 -0.0171 
[0.0043]*** [0.0053]*** [0.00461]***  [0.0040]*** [0.0045]  [0.0051]  [0.0052]  [0.0051]**  [0.0064]*  [0.0073]** 
Constant  1.1660 0.9943 1.0553 1.0959 1.1374 1.1821 1.2264 1.2936 1.3615 1.4854 
[0.0155]*** [0.0174]*** [0.01481]***  [0.0132]*** [0.0155]*** [0.0182]*** [0.0195]*** [0.0192]*** [0.0242]*** [0.0267]***
Observations  15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 
R-squared 0.45 
          
Specification 2 
Min.  years  of  education  0.0176 0.0129 0.0144 0.0138 0.0142 0.0146 0.0156 0.0164 0.0180 0.0197 
[0.0011]*** [0.0014]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0010]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0013]*** [0.0015]*** [0.0021]***
Vocational  degree  -0.0109 0.0097  -0.0022 -0.0041 -0.0166 -0.0198 -0.0153 -0.0204 -0.0154 -0.0090 
[0.0097] [0.0123] [0.0094] [0.0090] [0.0087]*  [0.0082]**  [0.0100] [0.0118]*  [0.0125] [0.0181] 
Age:15-24  years  old  -0.2420 -0.1265 -0.1400 -0.1728 -0.1896 -0.1957 -0.2226 -0.2569 -0.2787 -0.3359 
[0.0140]*** [0.0180]*** [0.0136]*** [0.0131]*** [0.0126]*** [0.0119]*** [0.0146]*** [0.0173]*** [0.0187]*** [0.0270]***
Age:25-34  years  old  -0.1348 -0.0605 -0.0742 -0.0982 -0.1081 -0.1062 -0.1200 -0.1445 -0.1479 -0.1683 
[0.0126]*** [0.0162]*** [0.0121]*** [0.0117]*** [0.0113]*** [0.0106]*** [0.0131]*** [0.0155]*** [0.0167]*** [0.0239]***
Age:35-44  years  old  -0.0432 0.0082  -0.0011 -0.0196 -0.0302 -0.0279 -0.0346 -0.0534 -0.0480 -0.0545 
[0.0122]*** [0.0158]  [0.0119]  [0.0114]*  [0.0110]*** [0.0103]*** [0.0127]*** [0.0150]*** [0.0161]*** [0.0229]** 
Age:45-54  years  old  -0.0135 0.0182  0.0115  -0.0029 -0.0160 -0.0044 -0.0108 -0.0275 -0.0183 -0.0229 
[0.0124] [0.0159] [0.0120] [0.0115] [0.0112] [0.0105] [0.0129] [0.0152]*  [0.0163] [0.0232] 
Tenure  in  years  0.0251 0.0325 0.0284 0.0248 0.0236 0.0233 0.0224 0.0208 0.0191 0.0171 
[0.0009]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0008]*** [0.0009]*** [0.0011]*** [0.0012]*** [0.0017]***
Tenure  squared/100  -0.0263 -0.0526 -0.0351 -0.0208 -0.0154 -0.0134 -0.0106 -0.0062 -0.0043 -0.0034 
[0.0038]*** [0.0047]*** [0.0036]*** [0.0035]*** [0.0034]*** [0.0032]*** [0.0039]*** [0.0046]  [0.0049]  [0.0072] 
Constant  1.6458 1.3300 1.4183 1.5260 1.5788 1.5813 1.6084 1.7160 1.9706 2.0660 
[0.0436]*** [0.0546]*** [0.0415]*** [0.0399]*** [0.0390]*** [0.0367]*** [0.0451]*** [0.0525]*** [0.0560]*** [0.0807]***
Observations  15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 15485 
R-squared 0.6 
Notes: as in Table A1. 
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Table A7: Breakdown of observed wage changed by decile 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
   
  All 
Observed  pay  change  (in  logs)  -0.021  -0.014  -0.008  -0.008 0.007 0.048 0.100 0.147 0.195 
Compositi o n   e f f e c t s   o f :            
  worker  characteristics  -0.049 -0.056 -0.062 -0.068 -0.083 -0.059 -0.063 -0.035  0.031 
  job  characteristics  -0.033 -0.012 -0.017 -0.026 -0.010  0.007  0.062  0.094  0.115 
Pr i c e   e f f e c t s   o f :            
  constant  -0.001 0.044 0.092 0.154 0.127 0.126 0.095 0.278 0.177 
  worker  characteristics  0.036  0.011 -0.002 -0.018 -0.034 -0.028 -0.020 -0.014  0.006 
  job  characteristics  0.000 -0.014 -0.039 -0.072 -0.025 -0.015  0.020 -0.180 -0.094 
Residual  effects  0.026 0.012 0.020 0.021 0.031 0.017 0.005 0.003  -0.039 
           
  Males 
Observed  pay  change  (in  logs)  -0.046  -0.041  -0.030  -0.013 0.027 0.084 0.124 0.174 0.211 
Composition  effects  of:           
  worker  characteristics  -0.068 -0.072 -0.073 -0.057 -0.081 -0.041 -0.023  0.027  0.064 
  job characteristics  -0.039  -0.020  -0.018  -0.010 0.001 0.076 0.077 0.112 0.118 
Pr i c e   e f f e c t s   o f :            
  constant  -0.011 0.040 0.119 0.116 0.248 0.171 0.010 0.197 0.066 
  worker  characteristics  0.023 -0.016 -0.012 -0.041 -0.032 -0.032 -0.016 -0.005  0.017 
  job  characteristics  0.024  0.010 -0.055 -0.021 -0.157 -0.095  0.068 -0.141 -0.049 
Residual  effects  0.025 0.017 0.009 0.000 0.048 0.005 0.008  -0.015  -0.004 
           
  Females 
Observed  pay  change  (in  logs)  0.001 0.021 0.037 0.043 0.060 0.074 0.109 0.163 0.213 
Composition  effects  of:           
  worker  characteristics  -0.042 -0.037 -0.035 -0.041 -0.045 -0.031 -0.028  0.007  0.036 
  job  characteristics  -0.024  -0.014  -0.008  -0.013 0.002 0.016 0.013 0.061 0.084 
Pr i c e   e f f e c t s   o f :            
  constant  0.004 0.061 0.166 0.179 0.116 0.077 0.125 0.364 0.288 
  worker  characteristics  0.023  0.016 -0.015 -0.026 -0.020 -0.029 -0.055 -0.052 -0.032 
  job  characteristics  -0.004 -0.024 -0.085 -0.070 -0.007  0.048  0.042 -0.195 -0.125 
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